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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote” standard imposes a
measure of equality onto any individual’s ability to influence an elec1
tion’s outcome. The Court has been reluctant to attach this standard to other election resources, like campaign expenditures, despite
the fear that money will bring about the appearance of impropriety
2
in democratic decision making. Recently, the Court reasserted this
3
position in Citizens United v. FEC, upholding a corporation’s right to
expend resources freely in support of political candidates and issues,
but the general proposition dates back to the Court’s pronouncement in Buckley v. Valeo, establishing the constitutional framework for
contemporary campaign finance regulation. The framework first laid
out in Buckley and developed subsequently continues to incur sub4
stantial criticism, usually advanced in the name of equality. But
equality is a tricky value to maximize; interventions that cause people
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J.D. candidate at the Law School and Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science Department
of the University of Pennsylvania. This Comment owes much to Professor Jeffrey Green,
David Bateman, Rosella Cappella, Murad Idris, Tim Weaver, Elspeth Wilson, the participants of the Political Theory Graduate Workshop, and the Editors of this Journal. They
all helped to make this project far better than what I could have accomplished on my
own. Finally, this project is deeply indebted to Professor C. Edwin Baker. He was a fantastic teacher and a great mentor. I claim all errors as my own.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964) (“‘[A]ll who participate in the election are
to have an equal vote . . . . This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963))).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (“[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that the “Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress the
speech altogether”).
See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204–06 (1994) (proposing not only to overturn the
precedent of Buckley, but also to require “equal-dollars-per-voter”).
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to become more equal along one dimension frequently have the op5
posite effect along another dimension.
One promising alternative avoids equality and instead recommends campaign finance rules in accordance with democratic principles themselves. This “institutionally bound” approach permits the
restriction of speech within the context of democratic and governing
institutions, but only to the extent necessary for carrying out the pur6
pose of those institutions. Recognizing that under certain conditions the rights of a speaker may run counter to other democratic
values, the institutionally bound approach rejects a categorical solution to speech regulation. Instead, the analysis proceeds much like
7
the Court’s analysis in Grayned v. City of Rockford, asking “whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activ8
ity of a particular” institution. Few disagree with the idea that
speech should enjoy broad protection in the electoral context. The
institutionally bound approach, however, holds that speech that
threatens to undermine the process of democratic decision making
9
can be regulated consistently with the First Amendment.
Significant theoretical work remains if the institutionally bound
approach is to give rise to a new framework for campaign finance
regulation. Until now, the framework has only elaborated a set of
campaign finance rules from the perspective of a pluralist democracy.
Elections in a pluralist democracy are “designed and regulated in order to promote the accuracy of the translation of public will into effi10
cacious political power.” This model draws attention to the preferences that individuals hold on a range of issues and how we define
11
legitimate representative behavior by aggregating those preferences.
Pluralist democracy, however, does not enjoy the last word on elec-
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Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 185
(1981) (“People can become equal (or at least more equal) in one way with the consequence that they become unequal (or more unequal) in others.”).
See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2
(1998) (noting that “explicitly political and fully protected speech is often subject to severe limits, justified by the goal of making the particular institutional element of government better perform its democratic and governing functions”).
408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding that Rockford’s antipicketing ordinance is not an unconstitutional regulation of activity around a school).
Id. at 116.
See id. at 116–17.
Baker, supra note 6, at 33.
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (expanded ed. 2006).
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tions; nor does the U.S. Constitution mandate that elections conform
12
to a pluralist vision of democracy.
Other democratic theories hold important lessons about elections
and provide alternative hypotheses about how democracy functions.
In an attempt to fill this gap, this Comment follows the institutionally
bound approach to campaign finance regulation, exploring elections
13
from the perspective of elite democratic theory. The elite model
draws a sharp distinction between elite actors, who possess the capabilities to govern, and non-elites, who rely on elites to bring about the
14
In accordance with this premise, the
benefits that states supply.
theory articulates a set of conditions necessary to ensure that nonelites enjoy protection from their government despite their simultaneous reliance on the capabilities that elites possess. Unlike their
role in pluralist democracy, elections do not make representation the
defining aspect of democracy. Rather, democracies differ from other
forms of political organization to the extent that they force elites to
undertake a special burden, namely a competitive struggle for political power. Elections institutionalize that special burden and prevent
political entrenchment, corruption, and domination by maximizing
15
competition between aspiring elites.
Despite the fact that many scholars reject the descriptive and pre16
scriptive value of elite democratic theory, I argue that elite democ-
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See Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 748–49 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“But even if it were thought that the rule announced today by the Court is, as a matter of political theory, the most desirable general rule which can be devised as a basis for
the make-up of the representative assembly of a typical State, I could not join in the fabrication of a constitutional mandate which imports and forever freezes one theory of political thought into our Constitution, and forever denies to every State any opportunity for
enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions, so as
to accommodate within a system of representative government the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly organized majority.”).
See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (Free Press 1965) (1922); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (HarperCollins Publishers 2008)
(1942); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1978) (1922).
Cf. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
562 (1977) (“If the Meiklejohn vision of active, continual involvement by citizens fails to
describe not only the reality but also the shared ideal of American politics, that vision
does not provide a secure basis for interpreting the First Amendment.”).
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 143–85 (1987).
First, the theory places less emphasis on aspects of representation and instead stresses
competition. See, e.g., Gerry Mackie, Schumpeter’s Leadership Democracy, 37 POL. THEORY
128 (2009). But see Jeffrey Edward Green, Three Theses on Schumpeter: Response to Mackie,
38 POL. THEORY (forthcoming 2010). Second, the model does not enjoy the normative
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ratic theory has important implications for campaign finance expenditures. For elections to work properly within an elite democracy, the
Constitution must regulate free speech to ensure that the electoral
process remains competitive and does not replicate social distributions of power in ways that would allow elites to entrench themselves
17
in government. Elite democratic theory, therefore, supports a consequentialist view of speech regulation, permitting restrictions on
those types of speech which impede competition, while guaranteeing
all other types of speech. Since money can be amassed in the eco18
nomic realm and transferred into the political arena, however, a potentially significant danger arises that elites will use elections to replicate—not replace—political power.
Therefore, Congress can
appropriately regulate campaign expenditures, despite the impact on
speech, as it preserves the purpose of holding elections.
Part II reviews the current election framework established under
Buckley, subsequent activity surrounding campaign finance regulation, and criticisms of the framework that should cause us to rethink
the rules regulating campaign finance. It also introduces the institutionally bound approach to speech regulation generally, and its application to campaign finance in particular. Part III relies on the
work of Joseph A. Schumpeter to develop a model of elite democ19
racy. Schumpeter’s model uses elections to protect society from political entrenchment, corruption, and domination by encouraging elites to constantly compete with one another by building and
realigning coalitions to avoid electoral defeat. In Part IV, the attention returns to campaign finance. I argue that for democracy to
function properly under elite democratic theory, election rules must
guarantee that everyone has the ability to run for office and that elections cannot replicate social power. The rationale on which the
20
Court relies in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce correctly
identifies a risk that elite democratic theory predicts and also supplies
an appropriate basis on which to regulate campaign expenditures.

17
18
19
20

appeal of republican or liberal democratic theory. It recognizes that inequality pervades
throughout society but does not try to alleviate it. Instead, it formulates a vision of democracy that works in spite of that inequality.
See infra Part IV.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
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II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
This Part reviews the Court’s response to campaign finance regulation, elaborating a framework oriented toward the threat or appearance of impropriety that arises from political quid pro quos.
Subpart B evaluates those attempts and concludes that the theoretical
picture of elections that emerges from this system insufficiently captures the dynamics involved in electoral decision making. Subpart C
summarizes the institutionally bound approach to campaign finance
and discusses the benefits it offers vis-à-vis the current system.
A. The Buckley Framework
The prevailing framework for evaluating the constitutionality of
campaign finance regulation arose in response to Congress’s efforts
to regulate money in elections by way of the Federal Elections Cam21
paign Act of 1971. The framework has evolved subsequently in the
face of new challenges, but its basic structure revolves around three
relevant dimensions. First, the framework draws a major distinction
22
between campaign contributions and expenditures. Limits on campaign contributions—those payments that transfer money directly to
a candidate—are appropriate under the Constitution because the
government has a compelling state interest in regulating “speech”
23
The
which threatens or creates the appearance of impropriety.
Buckley Court acknowledges that “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence [in the
system of representative Government is] . . . not to be eroded to a disas24
trous extent.” Legislative efforts which secure the processes of representative government outweigh the infringements that those efforts
25
Limits on campaign expendiplace on individual free speech.
tures—those payments under the control of an individual who uses
them to advance her own viewpoint on political issues—

21
22
23

24
25

Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 301–311, 86 Stat. 3, 11–19 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431
(2006).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976).
Id. at 23 (“[A]lthough the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate
fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly
more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association
than do its limitations on financial contributions.”).
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
Id. at 29 (“We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior
decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to
political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.”).

1262

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:4

impermissibly intrude on constitutionally protected free speech guarantees. As a general rule, individuals should be allowed to expend
resources to further their own views. Unlike campaign contributions,
expenditure transactions do not involve direct contact with candidates, and therefore the threat of political quid pro quos dimin26
ishes.
Second, the framework distinguishes between elections that in27
volve candidates and those elections that do not. Again referring to
the threat of political quid pro quos, the Court has consistently rejected spending limits for initiatives and referenda since the threat of
28
currying favor from candidates does not exist. Much like campaign
expenditures, the appearance or threat of impropriety does not arise
29
when the candidate is absent from the transaction.
The last major dimension of the contemporary campaign finance
framework implicates the identity of the speaker. Initially in First Na30
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, and most recently in Citizens United v.
31
FEC, the Court has asserted that First Amendment guarantees do
32
The
not discriminate between corporations and natural persons.
speaker’s identity does not diminish the inherent worth of speech
33
and its capacity to inform the public. These arguments, which op26

27
28
29

30
31
32

33

Id. at 19–20 (“The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial
rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.
The $1,000 ceiling on spending ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’ would appear
to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication. Although the Act’s limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political
parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling.” (internal citations omitted) (footnote call numbers
omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 608 (e)(1) (1970 & Supp. 1975))).
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297–99 (1981).
Id.
The Court in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley noted that the compelling state
interest which animated Buckley—political quid pro quos—did not threaten electoral decisions on referenda. Therefore, a Berkeley ordinance limiting individual contributions
to a group promoting a referendum was held unconstitutional. See id.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.”).
In Bellotti, the Court struck down a regulation prohibiting a corporation from making
contributions and expenditures for the purpose of influencing a referendum. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, believed that this was the type of speech indispensible to
decision making in a democracy. A provision of the Federal Election and Campaign Act
of 1971 again came before the Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
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pose restrictions on corporate speech, often rely on the notion that
any speaker’s attempt to increase the quantity of information that
34
voters can use ought to be protected. Efforts to restrict a speaker’s
contributions, these arguments conclude, “all too often simply” serve
35
as “a means to control content.”
In a series of intervening cases, however, the Court reversed itself
36
on this position. In Austin, an alternative majority recognized that
corporations possess a unique capacity to amass money in the economic marketplace and subsequently leverage that resource in the
37
Those who favor restrictions on corporate
political marketplace.
speech often fear the possibility that unequal access will displace other voices from the public sphere or otherwise bring about conditions
38
where the quantity of information is reduced. Therefore, corporations are restrained in their capacity to contribute.
B. Evaluating the Buckley Framework
The Court’s continued reliance on the Buckley framework has met
significant criticism. The first distinction in the Buckley framework—
differentiating between contributions and expenditures—suffers

34

35
36
37

38

238 (1986). That statute prohibited corporations from using general treasury funds for
independent expenditures in connection with elections for public office. But, since
MCFL was: (1) not a business corporation, (2) not created for economic gain, (3) without
shareholders, and (4) without business, the Court struck down the provision. Id. at 259.
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In permitting Michigan to make private corporations the first object of this Orwellian announcement, the Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an
evil that the democratic majority can proscribe.”); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (holding that states can constitutionally limit the capacity of corporations to contribute to elections using general treasury funds).
Id. at 658–59 (“State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets—
that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that
maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages
not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also
permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.’”); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the interest of the state “is not one of equalizing the resources of opposing
candidates or opposing positions, but rather of preventing institutions which have been
permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair advantage in the political process, especially where, as here, the issue involved has no material connection
with the business of the corporation. The State need not permit its own creation to consume it”).
Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2780 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If only one candidate
can make himself heard, the voter’s ability to make an informed choice is impaired.”).
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from a glaring deficiency: the dissimilarities that sustain their respec39
tive treatment in theory cannot be sustained in practice. Issues are
40
too easily associated with candidates or parties. Therefore, when a
voter encounters an advertisement, he connects the message with the
candidate, allowing the candidate to benefit from independent expenditures in ways that still encourage a debt of gratitude. In turn,
candidates can easily identify the authors of independently issued—
and expensive—advertisements that advocate on behalf of a candidate or her cause. This allows the candidate to follow through on her
feelings of gratitude. Therefore, when a donor reaches his contribution limit, he can simply find other channels to assist his preferred
candidate, thereby circumventing the constitutionally permissible
41
limits on campaign contributions.
If the distinction between contributions and expenditures proves
unsustainable, it does not automatically follow that Congress can regulate expenditures. It should, however, cause us to revisit an earlier
question: why are quid pro quos so offensive that regulation is justified? As already discussed, the Buckley Court acknowledges a strong
interest in “the appearance of improper influence . . . in the system of rep-

39

See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (attempting to distinguish between contributions and noncandidate campaign expenditures); see
also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 964 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Many corporate independent expenditures, it seems, had become essentially interchangeable with direct contributions in their capacity to generate quid pro quo arrangements.”); McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 129–30 (2003) (“In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a
six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive investigation into the campaign
practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention to the effect
of soft money on the American political system, including elected officials’ practice of
granting special access in return for political contributions. The committee’s principal
findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in the majority’s report,
while the minority report primarily described Republican practices. The two reports
reached consensus, however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the ‘soft
money loophole’ had led to a ‘meltdown’ of the campaign finance system that had been
intended ‘to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing
the electoral process.’ One Senator stated that ‘the hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble.’” (footnote call number omitted)).

40

This assertion is at odds with many of the empirical conclusions about voter knowledge.
See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
331 (2000) [hereinafter Converse, Mass Electorates]; Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief
Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206 (David E. Apter ed., 1964).

41

See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (“Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is
deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the
guise of political contributions.”).
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resentative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” A
representative acts with legitimate authority to the extent that her of43
ficial conduct conforms to the public’s will. If she uses her office in
ways that deviate from the public’s will to reward individuals who help
her gain office, it places considerable strain on the concept of representation. The Court fails to spell out the remainder of the argument, but presumably it concludes as follows: speech and money play
44
a necessary role in elections, but the Constitution does not protect
those resources a candidate might use to undermine democratic decision making. Congress’s purported understanding of speech distinguishes between two kinds: speech necessary to carry out elections
and speech that undermines them.
The Buckley Court, however, offers a blanket rebuttal that does not
differentiate along similarly nuanced lines. This leaves the Court’s
interpretation of the First Amendment in direct conflict with Congress’s vision of representative government. The Buckley Court takes
45
away the obvious general remedy it employed in Reynolds v. Sims,
placing an upper limit on the ability of any individual to influence an
election’s outcome. Instead, the Court rejected “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
46
in order to enhance the relative voice of others.”
The second distinction—involving the presence or absence of
candidates in the electoral process—also suffers from similar criticism. Imagine a business which exclusively funds an initiative that favored its position vis-à-vis its competitors, but those competitors were
not in a position to compete with resources of their own. Applying
the Buckley framework, that scenario does not offend the Constitution’s campaign expenditure framework. But it is not clear that the
framework identifies the correct aspect of the case. The facts are easily manipulated to produce the counterfactual scenario in which a
business funds a candidate who promises to enact legislation that
punishes the business’ competitors in exactly the same way. In the
first scenario, the initiative does not feature a candidate. But this

42

43

44
45
46

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
565 (1973)).
DAHL, supra note 11, at 131 (“We expect elections to reveal the ‘will’ or the preferences of
a majority on a set of issues.”). Dahl goes on to note that “[t]his is one thing elections
rarely do, except in an almost trivial fashion.” Id.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884 (“All speakers, including individuals and the media,
use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech . . . .”).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
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counterfactual scenario makes plain how the business manipulates
the general will if we assume that the victory can be fairly attributed
47
The counterfactual suggests that
to the difference in influences.
money does not give rise to the problem. Instead, the process does
not feature meaningful competition and, in doing so, it ultimately
deprives some people of their say in the collective decision-making
process. The value of equality lurks in the background, but we are
left uneasy because of the selection bias that has produced the result.
Essentially, the election’s purpose of measuring opinions has been
distorted.
The third distinction—differentiating between a natural and corporate person—gives rise to a boundary problem that violates notions
of complex equality. The Austin Court argues that corporations are
particularly well-suited to amass money and translate that money into
48
the realm of electoral politics. Allowing inequitably distributed social goods and resources to transfer between social spheres propagates inequality. Theories of “complex equality” permit inequalities
in any particular sphere of life; but those inequalities should not dic49
Questions
tate the distribution of social goods in other spheres.
over the distribution of social goods animate politics. If the inputs
into a democratic decision-making process reflect social biases, then
we should expect a similar bias in the output thereby violating the
minimal condition of complex equality. If public opinion is to guide
policy making through representative government, then certain influences must be excluded from the articulation of public opinion.
That proposition has long been a part of our First Amendment tradi50
However, it has less to do with the identity of donors and
tion.
more to do with the transfer of resources between different social
spheres.

47

48

49
50

This seems to be a reasonable inference. Statistical research suggests that campaign contributions and expenditures can have a significant effect on election outcomes. Alan
Gerber, Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 401, 410 (1998); Donald Philip Green & Jonathan
S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884, 900 (1988).
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (holding that
states can constitutionally limit the capacity of corporations to contribute to elections using general treasury funds).
See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983).
Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (arguing that “public opinion . . . is the final source of government in a democratic state,” as opposed to civil disobedience).
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C. The Institutionally Bound Approach to Campaign Finance
The preceding critique has relied heavily on the assumption that
social boundaries can be drawn around the various spheres of social
life, in general, and legal institutions, in particular. It is an assump51
tion that law frequently makes, but other evidence suggests this is
52
For the sake of this argument, however, I propose
not the case.
that, at least with respect to electoral resources, the law can maintain
a boundary between electoral decision making and the political do53
Indeed, it is an assumption commonly emmain more broadly.
ployed in First Amendment doctrine to justify the regulation of
speech in limited domains that facilitates the function of those insti54
tutions. According to this institutionally bound approach, “speech
normally and properly only receives protection consistent with the in55
stitution of which it is a part.” Even political speech—recognized as
56
enjoying the highest level of constitutional protection —is “often
subject to severe limits, justified by the goal of making the particular
institutional element of government better perform its democratic
57
and governing functions.” If the boundaries are not reasonably definable, speech regulation can extend too far into other realms of social life, harming the individual and social benefits that result from
regulation of speech. If that were the case, it would be difficult to justify the institutionally bound approach.
Under some circumstances, institutions that restrict speech can
58
59
produce democratically valuable consequences. Schools, courts,

51

52

53

54
55
56
57
58

Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause
does not provide Congress with authority to enact a federal civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that
the Brady Act’s provision commanding CLEOs to conduct background checks is unconstitutional).
Timothy Mitchell, The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, 85 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 77, 77 (1991) (arguing that the state-society boundary is characterized by a
high degree of ambiguity, and this feature is not simply a theoretical artifact).
This is necessary because the institutionally bound approach to speech regulation relies
heavily on reasonably definable institutional boundaries. Since “resources,” like votes,
“and activities,” like debates, “are authoritatively organized to further or accomplish [the]
particular objectives” of democratic elections, the law demonstrates sufficient capacity to
create electoral institutions without undermining the political sphere altogether. Baker,
supra note 6, at 19.
See infra notes 63–65.
Baker, supra note 6, at 2.
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 483 (1988) (“Political speech . . . is at the core of
the First Amendment.”).
Baker, supra note 6, at 2.
See Pickering v. Board

1268

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:4

60

and legislatures all rely on rules that prohibit certain forms of
speech so as to ensure that disruptive efforts do not undermine a
broader institutional purpose. We tolerate certain infringements on
speech rights to facilitate the functioning of these institutions.
The institutionally bound approach makes room for a larger theoretical understanding of elections within democratic theory by inviting a functional analysis of how elections work. “The concept of ‘institutionally bound’ refers to situations where resources and activities
are authoritatively organized to further or accomplish particular ob61
jectives within a limited realm of social life.” Elections meet these
62
criteria. Therefore, to the extent that elections are themselves normatively desirable, the approach holds that Congress can regulate
speech consistent with the First Amendment when necessary to protect the institution of democratic decision making.
III. ELECTIONS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
Translating popular sovereignty into specific acts of governance
requires theoretical elaboration. Liberal and republican conceptions
of democracy make use of the “public will,” which gives voice to the
preferences of a political community and instructs elected representatives to adopt rules in the community’s name. Elite democrats reject this account on two grounds. First, the people are either not interested in or not capable of formulating a coordinated will on most
63
issues. Second, elite democratic theorists also disagree with the liberal assumption that individual preferences are well-defined and in
64
some sense exogenous to the electoral process. But these theorists

of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), limiting speech to encourage a better learning environment in schools.
59
See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), and Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959), upholding court orders to testify or produce information.
60
Consider SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 99–104 (1997), discussing the importance of the “gag rule”
as a procedural innovation to counter the disruptive potential of sectional politics in the
U.S. House of Representatives.
61
Baker, supra note 6, at 19.
62
Cf. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
63
LIPPMANN, supra note 13, at 197 (“There is no prospect . . . that the whole invisible environment will be so clear to all men that they will spontaneously arrive at sound public
opinions on the whole business of government. And even if there were a prospect, it is
extremely doubtful whether many of us would wish to be bothered, or would take the
time . . . .”).
64
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13, at 253 (stating that an individual’s preference “must be
something more than an indeterminate bundle of vague impulses loosely playing about
given slogans and mistaken impressions”). As an empirical fact, this may be justified. See
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do not give up on the promise of democracy. Instead, they attempt
to overcome the threats of political entrenchment, corruption, and
domination that would seemingly arise in a world marked by inequality by designing a democratic system that fights against these dan65
gers.
A. Elite Democracy
66

In an elite democracy, governance is about problem solving.
This is especially true for modern societies, which must coordinate
mass behavior and deal with the consequences when that coordination fails. Many contemporary political debates focus on the government’s appropriate level of involvement in specific areas of social
life, but few would argue that the state could be removed without
drastically reshaping society and its capacity to maintain itself in its
current form. By learning how to solve these problems, the state has
amassed significant power and authority to coordinate collective action, adjudicate disputes, and even structure the public and private
spheres. That power makes the state extraordinarily useful, but particularly dangerous to society itself.
Elite democratic theorists offer a model of democracy that harnesses the state’s power while limiting its capacity to use it against so67
ciety. This model adopts three assumptions. First, society faces a
number of problems that often require highly technical and special68
ized knowledge to solve. Second, individuals are not equal in their

65
66

67

68

JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 210 (1992) (discussing how
“public attitudes toward major issues are a response to the relative intensity of competing
political communications on those issues”); Converse, Mass Electorates, supra note 40 (exploring the extreme variance in political information from the top to the bottom of the
public).
IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 55–58 (2003) (discussing Schumpeter’s
approach to the democratic management of power relations).
See HELD, supra note 15 (formulating a vision of democracy that works in spite of societal
inequality); SHAPIRO, supra note 65; C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (1998) (discussing democratic theories and the corresponding
demands they make on the media).
Ian Shapiro offers a good summary of the options that individuals face in a Schumpeterian world.
The underlying logic of his argument is disarmingly simple. It reduces to a double
claim: (1) that structured competition for power is preferable both to Hobbesian
anarchy and to the power monopoly that Hobbes saw as the logical response to it,
and (2) that the choices among anarchy, monopoly, and competition are the only
meaningful possibilities.
SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 55.
Baker, supra note 66, at 321 (“Good governments must routinely respond to problems
that are technically complex.”).
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69

capabilities to solve those problems. Third, while a relatively small
portion of the population possesses the capability to solve these
highly technical problems, these “elites” are not so scarce that they
70
can exercise a monopoly over political competition.
To gain control over the state’s apparatus, elites attempt to leverage their problem-solving skills in exchange for political office. Once
in possession of the state’s apparatus, however, elites have at their
71
disposal all they need to entrench themselves permanently. Without some process to displace entrenched elites, society faces the
72
prospect of suffering under an unresponsive authoritarian regime.
Schumpeter proposes to combat entrenchment through competition
73
by making use of two processes. First, he employs elections to create
incentives for elites to attend to society’s problems. But in his view,
elections do not serve to aggregate the public’s preferences on public
matters since those preferences are not adequately formed. Instead,
he conceives of a role for the electorate commensurate with its capacity. Simply put, “the role of the people is to produce a government”
74
through elections. We select those representatives who inspire confidence and propose to solve the problems that we find most important. In turn, the leadership must select those problems which reso75
nate with the public to obtain and retain power.
A number of factors constrain the selection process. In a properly
76
functioning elite democracy, “no leadership is absolute.” By selecting the wrong issue or resolving it poorly, the leadership invites competitors to seize a missed or poorly executed opportunity to displace

69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76

Id. (“Most people have neither the interest nor the ability to understand, much less to
devise solutions for, the problems facing society that government should address.”).
See generally id. (“Experts and specialists at understanding the economic, human, and
natural environments must do the bulk of the government’s decision making work.”).
Ian Shapiro offers a good summary of the options that individuals face in a Schumpeterian world.
The underlying logic of his argument is disarmingly simple. It reduces to a double
claim: (1) that structured competition for power is preferable both to Hobbesian
anarchy and to the power monopoly that Hobbes saw as the logical response to it,
and (2) that the choices among anarchy, monopoly, and competition are the only
meaningful possibilities.
SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 55.
Id.
Id.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13, at 269.
Id. at 279. The leadership does not care as much about the substantive issues involved as
it does about the opportunities that arise in selecting and solving those problems.
Id. at 280.
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77

the current leadership.
The controlling leadership faces threats
from other opposition leaders, as well as from outside of the formal
channels of government. If the leadership “fails to absorb certain issues either because the . . . [leadership or] the opposition’s forces do
not appreciate their political values . . . . [s]uch issues may then be
78
taken up by outsiders who prefer making an independent bid.” To
obtain or retain power, therefore, requires that those in power constantly rethink their strategies within coalitions. The fear of displacement constrains the leadership as it attempts to negotiate the
79
problems it proposes to solve with the leadership’s following.
In
turn, the leadership’s following negotiates “a middle course between
an unconditional allegiance to the leader’s standard and an uncondi80
tional raising of a standard of [its] own.” These coalitions are necessary to pass legislation, but they are also fractious. Even representatives with lesser claims to power can extract concessions in exchange
81
for loyalty to other agendas. Coalition building and coalition realignments produce an environment defined by a “considerable
amount of freedom” for any representative to seek re-alignment in
82
search of better opportunities.
Schumpeter’s concept of “Creative Destruction” rests at the center
83
of his theory of democracy. The incentives driving elites constantly
create the possibility for the breaking of old coalitions and the recreation of new ones. Schumpeter recognized the concept as the “es84
sential fact about capitalism,” but translates the concept into the po85
litical sphere as well. Elites organize to “exploit new opportunities,”
capitalizing on issues missed by other elites. By doing so, elites face a
dynamic environment that resists political entrenchment. “[W]e
77

78
79
80

81

82
83
84
85

Id. at 280, 286 (“The Prime Minister has to watch his opponents all the time, to lead his
own flock incessantly, to be ready to step into breaches that might open at any moment,
to keep his hand on the measures under debate.”).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 280–81.
Id. at 281. For a particularly convincing portrayal of the constraints that coalitional and
identity politics place on elite actors, see WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, APPEARANCE AND REALITY
IN POLITICS 63 (1981) (discussing the ideological and structural constrains that animate
the process of coalition building).
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13, at 281 (“Groups that are strong enough to make their resentment felt yet not strong enough to make it profitable to include their protagonists
and their programs in the governmental arrangement will in general be allowed to have
their way in minor questions.”).
Id. at 281.
Id. at 81–86, 280–81.
Id. at 83.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS 23 (2009) (exploring “creative
destruction” as a form of creative stimulation).
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must start from the competitive struggle for power and office and realize that the social function is fulfilled, as it were, incidentally—in
86
the same sense as production is incidental to the making of profits.”
Like other evolutionary systems, electoral politics produces emergent
social goods—political responsiveness and protection—from individual behavior, here captured in the pursuit of power.
B. Elections in a Self-Governing, Inegalitarian System
Some features of this model deserve additional discussion. In
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy, the entrenchment of power poses
the greatest threat and undermines the emergent social benefits of
democratic governance. The system has to remain dynamic and responsive, or else the incentives will be misconstrued to work against
competition in favor of corruptive politics. The institution’s rules are
constructed to encourage competition. The more a party is able to
entrench its power, the greater the potential that the system deviates
from democratic “responsiveness”—not defined in terms of the public will, but acknowledged through the leadership’s decision about
which problems to make public issues. Therefore, the rules of the
game have to be structured so that competition is made to combat
corruption.
It is important to recognize that elite democracy rejects the notion
87
of a public will, but not the concept of public opinion. Unlike liberal models of democracy, which presume that individuals know their
preferences and that those preferences are in some sense exogenous
to the electoral process, for elite democrats, public opinion is
“shaped [by elites], and the shaping of it is an essential part of the
88
democratic process.” Individuals either have a vague sense of their
preferences or do not know how they feel until presented with options. Simply put, individuals do not possess the capacity to solve
complex social problems without assistance from the state. Elites
contribute significantly to the structure of debate by setting the public agenda and constraining the number of options available to solve
89
society’s problems. Elections provide the primary way of constrain-

86
87
88
89

SCHUMPETER, supra note 13, at 282.
Elite democratic theorists remain skeptical of public opinion’s clarity.
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13, at 282 (“The initiative [to shape the public will] lies with the
candidate who makes a bid for . . . office . . . .”).
Id. at 281 (“Second, there are cases in which the political engine fails to absorb certain
issues either because the high commands of the government’s and the opposition’s forces
do not appreciate their political values or because these values are in fact doubtful. Such
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ing decisions the community must make into a manageable form
where voters “confine themselves to accepting [one alternative] . . . in
90
preference to others or refusing to accept it.”
Information retains a central place in this enterprise. Once the
agenda has been set and the choices constrained, individuals still require information to determine which candidate can best serve their
own interests. “If, on principle at least, everyone is free to compete
for political leadership by presenting himself to the electorate, this
will in most cases . . . mean a considerable amount of freedom of dis91
cussion for all.” Only then can a majority express a “Manufactured
92
Will.” But speech is not unlimited in Schumpeter’s model. Rather,
it remains bound to the larger purpose that it serves in fostering political competition. Therefore, unlike the Buckley framework, the elite
model of democracy makes clear why regulations can appropriately
differentiate between the speech that animates elections and the
speech used to undermine collective decision-making processes.
The success of elite democracy requires that two conditions be
93
94
met. First, access to political contests must be guaranteed. This
means that free association rights have to be meaningful and the rank
of office must be open to all. If individuals are allowed to organize
their electoral resources, they can make a bid at electoral office or, to
a lesser extent, influence policies in exchange for support in other
95
areas. Individuals have to be relevant in two capacities. First, they
pose a constant threat to representatives who ignore relevant issues.
The threat of seeking office should cause incumbents to take the
96
concerns of the public seriously. Essentially, by ensuring that offices

90
91
92
93

94

95
96

issues may then be taken up by outsiders who prefer making an independent bid for
power to serving in the ranks of one of the existing parties.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 271–72 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 270.
Schumpeter actually outlines several necessary conditions. See id. at 290–96 (describing
five conditions: the sufficiently high quality of elected officials; the limited range of effective political decision making; the services of a well-trained bureaucracy; “Democratic
Self-control;” and effective competition for leadership).
NORTH ET AL., supra note 85, at 22 (“Control of the political system is open to entry by any
group and contested through prescribed, and typically formal, constitutional means. All
citizens have the right to form organizations, and they use the services of the state to
structure the internal and external relationships of their organizations to individuals and
other organizations.”).
SCHUMPETER, supra note 13 at 281 (outlining how groups can influence decisions even
when they do not find it necessary to present their own candidate for election).
Id. at 281 (“[G]roups that are strong enough to make their resentment felt yet not strong
enough to make it profitable to include their protagonists and their programs in the gov-
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are contestable by everyone, elite democracy devolves agenda-setting
power to the general public. “In all normal cases the initiative lies
97
with the candidate who makes a bid for the office . . . .” Second,
open access ensures that smaller coalitions are not ignored. “In particular, groups that are strong enough to make their resentment felt
yet not strong enough to make it profitable to include their protagonists and their programs in the governmental arrangement will in
98
general be allowed to have their way in minor questions . . . .” Since
the initiative for change rests with individuals from both inside and
outside the governing sphere, political leadership must remain attentive to the demands of lesser political players. Even those who do not
hold office can leverage attention by putting new candidates on the
ballot and making issues a part of public debate.
Second, while competition does not have to be perfect, it has to
be meaningful. Meaningful political competition requires that the
resources necessary for effective competition in elections be distinct
from the inequitable distribution of those resources in society. Votes
offer an instructive case. Most citizens possess the right to vote, but
those votes provide little currency in most other aspects of life. If
votes do not have value in other spheres of society, then “no citizen’s
standing in one sphere . . . can be undercut by his standing in some
99
other sphere, with regard to some other good.” If the electoral system is structured in ways that empowers some voters to have greater
influence than others, then the system encourages new and incumbent candidates to curry favor from those that have greater influence,
100
This violates the necessary maxim of
propagating inequalities.
complex equality: “No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without re101
Unlike simple equality, which “would regard to the meaning of x.”
quire continual state intervention to break up or constrain incipient
monopolies and to repress new forms of dominance,” complex equality simply requires that resources amassed in various social spheres
102
remain relatively independent.

97
98
99
100

101
102

ernmental arrangement will in general be allowed to have their way in minor questions . . . .”).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 281.
WALZER, supra note 49, at 19.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by
a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”).
WALZER, supra note 49, at 20.
Id. at 15.
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IV. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
It may be helpful to take stock of the argument thus far. The critique of the Buckley framework refines our grasp of the way inequality
can adversely affect electoral decision making. Inequalities are a fact
of life, but the elite model of democracy reminds us that inequality
does not necessarily undermine the value of having elections. One of
the primary lessons of Schumpeter’s model holds that the political
system has to remain attentive to those inequalities or else they can
give rise to potentially dangerous political dynamics, entrenching political power to society’s detriment. Entrenchment can occur when
citizens amass resources in other spheres of life and use them to dictate the outcome of collective decision-making processes. This Part
completes the argument by drawing out these conclusions for elections that rely on private campaign finance schemes.
The elite model of democracy shares an affinity with previous Supreme Court decisions that regulate the influence of money on elections, but this model is unique in that it justifies that regulation in
terms of competitiveness. The Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce drew attention
to the source of improper advantage in electoral competition. Corporations enjoy state-created advantages that allow them “to play a
dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use
‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair
103
The Court defined this
advantage in the political marketplace.’”
unfair advantage because it deviated from public opinion, concluding
that “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form . . . have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas,” and therefore provided sufficient justi104
fication to restrict independent expenditures.

103

Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990); see also FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 267 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In light of
the special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form, we have considered
these dangers sufficient to justify restrictions on corporate political activity.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (noting the “special advantages that the State confers
on the corporate form”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting) (“It has long been recognized however, that the special status of
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts of economic power
which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of
our democracy, the electoral process.”).

104

Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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The elite model of democracy stands at odds with this conclusion,
focusing instead on unfair competition and evaluating that concept
with reference to electoral resources. In other words, even if a cor105
poration’s ideas do not deviate from public opinion, elite democrats would still take objection with corporate involvement. By amassing resources in one sphere and transferring those resources into the
electoral realm, one entity can control the election’s agenda in ways
that undermine the position of other interests in the electoral
106
The process of excluding certain influences—like physical
sphere.
strength or bribes—from elections is standard practice. We use elections to filter out impermissible influences on the collective decisionmaking process. By prohibiting some resources, elections make other resources more valuable. Votes, time, and money help candidates
107
in their pursuit of political office.
Constrained by these resources,
individuals seek to maximize their influence and elections tolerate a
certain measure of inequality.
Unlike votes and time, however, the distribution of money varies
greatly over the population. Yet this does not offend the elite model
of democracy. Rather, the model looks to overcome such inequalities
through the use of institutional arrangements. If it can be shown
empirically that the unequal distribution of a social good creates wild
disparities in the influence that different people have over the outcome of an election, then candidates will face strong incentives to cater to those who wield the greatest influence. The electorate requires
a constrained agenda before it can select a government. Implicit in
this conception is an admission that no neutral debate can be had.
Rather, biases are inherent in political debates as elites select, prime,

105

Cf. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258 (“The resources in the treasury of a business corporation . . . are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political
ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political
presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of
its ideas.”).

106

Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United v. FEC, offers an important rebuttal to this argument. “All speakers,” he maintains, “including individuals and the media,
use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.” 130 S. Ct.
876, 884 (2010). This is most certainly true and captures an important reality about democracy in a mass-media society. Yet, in doing so, he fails to acknowledge how discrepancies in wealth may make an individual’s ability to exercise her free speech rights contingent on wealth itself. Elite democrats find this aspect problematic because of the
consequences it may have on electoral competition.

107

See generally SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY (1995) (outlining how each factor
influences elections); Henry E. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271 (1995) (developing a resource model of political participation, considering the resources of time, money, and civic skills).
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and frame issues in ways that benefit their own circumstances. But
two tendencies prevent elites from running away with the debate.
Under normal circumstances, when issues do not make it onto the
agenda, political entrepreneurs can attempt to create new coalitions.
However, when certain individuals systematically wield greater influence, even entrepreneurs will find incentives to cater to their interests. Therefore, elite democratic theory is sympathetic to the position
annunciated in Austin, that “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” should not be used to obtain “an unfair advantage in the
108
The elite model justifies that position with
political marketplace.”
reference to the larger goal of maintaining competitive elections
109
within an institutional framework free of systematic biases. Regulation is, therefore, justified after an empirical showing of disparate influence over election outcomes. That evidence has been repeatedly
110
established.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that regulation of campaign finance
expenditures is appropriate under the model of elite democracy. If
we accept as unavoidable the existence of some inequality in society,
elite democratic theory helps us to recognize how inequality can
propagate itself through the political system and how we might address that problem to produce a more desirable style of politics for
citizens. The model offers relevant insight when considering the role
that money should play in electoral contests. Unlike most critiques of
the Buckley framework of campaign finance, the elite model of democracy deviates from the general criticisms which equate inequality
with unfairness. Instead, this model provides a more nuanced view,
focusing on how the allocation of specific resources amassed in one
institutional context and deployed in another undermines the purpose of having competitive elections. Unfairness in the realm of electoral politics needs to be understood in relation to political competition. Doing so allows us to differentiate between speech which

108
109

110

Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. at 257).
WALZER, supra note 49, at 19 (“In formal terms, complex equality means that no citizen’s
standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by his standing
in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.”).
Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page, Oligarchy in the United States?, 7 PERSP. POL. 731,
731 (2009) (“Data on the US distributions of income and wealth . . . suggest that the
wealthiest Americans may exert vastly greater political influence than average citizens . . . .”).
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facilitates democracy and speech which serves to undermine it, and
why unregulated campaign expenditures do not warrant constitutional free speech protections.

